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COLLEGE SPORTS AND NCAA ENFORCEMENT
PROCEDURES: DOES THE NCAA PLAY FAIRLY? NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION V. MILLER
INTRODUCTION
"The things we were asking for-open hearings, the right to confront
accusers-are basic American rights, yet they are wiped out in an arbitrary
manner by the Gestapo NCAA."'
In 1985, investigators for the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA)2 looked into possible recruiting violations involving high school
basketball star Lloyd Daniels? The NCAA targeted the University of
Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV)4 basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian5 for the
alleged foul play.6 The subsequent investigations were characteristic of the
already bitter relationship between Tarkanian and the NCAA.7 Indeed, as
early as 1973, the head of the NCAA's enforcement department vowed that
"4we are not only going to get [Tarkanian], we are going to run him out of
1. Nevada State Representative Jim McGaughey reflects his opinions, and those of other law
makers, that the powerful NCAA conducts unfair investigations of colleges and universities for
alleged sports recruiting violations. Douglas Lederman, Judge Voids Nevada Laws Limiting
NCAA Inquiries, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, June 17, 1992, at A35.
2. "The NCAA is a voluntary, unincorporated association of colleges, universities, and
affiliated conferences and organizations. The NCAA consists of approximately one thousand,
fifty-six (1,056) members, including most public and private universities and four-year colleges.
Its members conduct major athletics programs in all fifty (50) states." National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Nev. 1992).
3. On July 20, 1989, UNLV's athletics director said "NCAA investigators had visited the
campus to look into possible violations in the recruitment in 1985 and 1986 of Lloyd Daniels,
a high-school basketball star who never played for the university." Status of Sports Investiga-
tions on College Campuses, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Sept. 16, 1992, at A40
[hereinafter Status]. "Lloyd 'Sweet Pea' Daniels, a 6-foot-8-inch swingman from New York
was regarded by many as the most talented schoolboy basketball player to come out of the Big
Apple since Lew Alcindor," a.k.a. Kareem Abdul Jabaar. DON YAEGER, UNDUE PROCESS: THE
NCAA's INJUSTICE FOR ALL 231 (Sara Chilton, ed., 1991).
4. UNLV is a public branch of the University of Nevada and a member of the NCAA.
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988). "The university is organized and operated
pursuant to provisions of Nevada's State Constitution, statutes, and regulations." Id.
5. Jerry Tarkanian was the head men's basketball coach for the University of Nevada Las
Vegas Runnin' Rebels from 1973-1992. Appellants' Opening Brief at 5 n. 5 , National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Nev. 1992) (No. 92-16184) (also on file with
the California Western Law Review) [hereinafter A.O.B.]. Tarkanian retains the highest
winning percentage in college basketball history. Id.
6. See generally National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Nev.
1992).
7. Dating as far back as 1970, when Tarkanian wrote a scathing article about the NCAA's
unfairness while at Long Beach State, the obsession of toppling Tarkanian has possessed the
NCAA. YAEGER, supra note 3, at 199-200. See also University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 594
P.2d 1159 (Nev. 1979), later proceeding, Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 741
P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), rev'd, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179
(1988).
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coaching."8
During the 1973 investigations, Tarkanian attempted to force the NCAA
to abide by due process requirements guaranteeing him a "fair" trial.9
However, in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, a wide
ranging decision which affected collegiate players, coaches and fans across
the nation, the United States Supreme Court held 5-4 that the NCAA was not
a state actor, and therefore not bound by the due process requirements of the
U.S. Constitution.1" Thus, Tarkanian's first attempt at securing procedural
due process against the NCAA for himself and other coaches failed.
However, in a secondary attempt at securing due process, and after
twenty years of conflict with the NCAA, 11 Tarkanian succeeded in securing
protection under a Nevada law. When the NCAA challenged the federal
constitutionality of that statute in June 1992, Tarkanian once again turned
from the basketball court to the courtroom. In the United States District
Court of Nevada, Tarkaniann argued that any NCAA investigation into
recruiting infractions would violate his due process rights as protected by a
1991 Nevada Due Process Statute. 3 Under Tarkanian's interpretation, the
statute would force the NCAA to give him minimum procedural due process
8. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 6 (citing Trial Record 108, Reference 11 at 20).
9. See generally University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d 1159 (Nev. 1979), later
proceeding, Tarkanian v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 741 P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), rev'd,
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
10. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
11. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 30.
12. Defendants include Robert F. Miller, Governor, State of Nevada and among others,
Jerry Tarkanian. Because Miller was dismissed from this action by previous order of the court,
Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1479, all defendants are hereinafter referred to as Tarkanian.
13. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1480; see also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 398.155-398.255 (1991).
Specifically, the Nevada Due Process Statute guarantees an accused the following:
1. The right to a hearing, after reasonable notice of the nature of the proceeding, the
governing rules of the proceeding, and the factual basis for each violation. Id. §398.155(1).
2. The right to be represented by counsel. Id. § 398.155(2).
3. The right to confront and respond to all witnesses and evidence. Id. § 398.155(2).
4. The right to the exchange of all evidence 30 days before any proceeding. Id. §
398.155(3).
5. The right to have all statements signed under oath and notarized. Id. §
398.155(4).
6. The right to have an official record kept of all proceedings. Id. § 398.165.
7. The right to receive transcriptions of all oral statements upon request. Id. §
398.175.
8. The right to exclude irrelevant evidence. Id. § 398.185(1).
9. The right to have an impartial person presiding over the proceeding. Id. §
398.195.
10. The right to have a decision rendered within a reasonable time, with findings of
fact based upon substantial evidence in the record and supported by a preponderance
of such evidence. Id. § 398.205
11. The right to a judicial review under the Nevada Administrative Procedures Act.
Id. § 398.215.
A.O.B., supra note 5, at 10.
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rights during its enforcement proceedings."4 In response, the NCAA con-
tended that the Nevada Due Process Statute violated the Commerce and
Contracts Clauses of the Constitution and therefore the NCAA was not bound
by the Nevada due process requirements.15
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Miller" the United States
District Court of Nevada broke new ground on the issue of whether state
statutes may impose due process restrictions on the NCAA. The court held
that Tarkanian was not entitled to state enacted due process protections
during NCAA investigations or enforcement proceedings. 7 The court
invalidated the Nevada statute on the grounds that it violated the Commerce
and Contract Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 8 First, the court found the
Nevada Due Process Statute violated the Commerce Clause because the
statute's public purpose of affording "basic due process safeguards to the
careers, livelihoods, and reputations of all Nevadans"19 was outweighed by
the fact "the statute effectively invalidated the NCAA's system of internal
governance and enforcement and imposed procedural requirements with
which the NCAA could not comply."' Second, the court ruled that the
statute violated the Contract Clause because 1) the court felt the Nevada
Due Process Statute specifically targeted the NCAA and not a broad societal
problem, and 2) the court felt the statute was not necessary to effectuate
change because Nevada schools could modify the NCAA's procedures at
NCAA conventions or get Congress to enact legislation limiting the
NCAA.21
Part I of this Note contrasts the NCAA enforcement procedures in
theory, with those in practice between the NCAA and Tarkanian. This Part
begins by introducing the NCAA's four step enforcement process which
appears theoretically functional. Next, by focusing on the dispute between
Tarkanian and the NCAA, Part I exposes the prejudicial nature of the
NCAA's system in actual practice. This noticeable disparity between theory
and reality lays the foundation for the further exploration of the reasons state
legislatures are fighting to put due process limitations on the NCAA.
Part II traces the historical context and recent developments of both the
Contract and Commerce Clauses. This Part lays the constitutional frame-
work necessary to discuss whether the Miller court correctly applied existing
case law.
The following section, Part III, analyzes the Nevada District Court's
opinion. Part III critiques each of the court's arguments concluding that the
14. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 9-10.
15. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1482.
16. 795 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Nev. 1992).
17. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1488.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1483.
20. Id. at 1485.
21. Id. at 1485-88.
1993]
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Miller court misapplied precedent and erred by striking down the Nevada
statute.
Part IV discusses the implications of the court's decision. This Part
compares the Nevada statute with similar legislation in Florida, Nebraska,
and Illinois. Part IV analyzes the impact the Miller holding has on existing
and pending state due process statutes.22
The Note concludes that few avenues exist for feasible NCAA restructur-
ing. Therefore, the only available means to successfully limit the NCAA are
to either reverse the Miller court's decision or lobby Congress to enact due
process legislation.
I. BACKGROUND: THE TUMULTUOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TARKANIAN AND THE NCAA
A. The NCAA's Enforcement Procedures in Theory
The basic purposes of the NCAA are 1) to keep intercollegiate sports a
part of education, 2) to include the athlete in the student body, and 3) to
retain a clear distinction between college and professional sports. 3 In order
to promote and enforce these goals, the NCAA follows the rules set forth in
the NCAA Manual.' These rules are determined by the NCAA member
institutions at their annual conventions.' "By joining the NCAA, each
member institution agrees to comply with and enforce the rules of the
NCAA,"' and in exchange members may participate in NCAA champi-
onship events.'
The NCAA Committee on Infractions enforces all rules violations,28
22. The states of Kansas, Ohio, Missouri, South Carolina, and Kentucky are also debating
similar legislation. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1485.
23. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOcIATION, 1992-93 NCAA MANUAL Const. art
1.3.1 at I [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
24. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23.
25. Id., Const. art. 5.01.1, at 27.
26. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1479 (citing NCAA Const. art. 2.5.1).
27. "The NCAA conducts seventy-six (76) annual NCAA championship events throughout
the United States involving member teams and individual student athletes from across the
country." Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1482.
28. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23, Bylaw art. 19.1 at 322.
Among the disciplinary measures that may be imposed by the committee against an
institution for major violations are:
(a) Reprimand and censure;
(b) Probation for one year;
(c) Probation for more than one year;
(d) Ineligibility for one or more NCAA Championship events;
(e) Ineligibility for invitational and post season meets and tournaments;
(f) Ineligibility for any television programs involving coverage of the institution's
intercollegiate athletics team or teams in the sport or sports in which the violations
occurred; (Revised: 1110/92)
(g) Ineligibility of the member to vote or its personnel to serve on committees of the
4
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and follows a four step enforcement process to investigate and impose pun-
ishment.' First, after the Committee receives a reasonable charge of a rule
violation from a "responsible source," the Committee begins a preliminary
inquiry ° The preliminary inquiry is a thorough investigation of the charge
to determine whether adequate evidence exists to warrant an official
inquiry. 31  The NCAA immediately notifies the member institution of all
preliminary inquiries. 2
Second, if adequate evidence of recruiting violations exists, the
Enforcement Committee begins an official inquiry.3 During an official
Association, or both;
(h) Prohibition against an intercollegiate sports team or teams participating against
outside competition for a specified period;
(i) Prohibition against the recruitment of prospective student-athletes for a sport or
sports for a specified period;
(j) A reduction in the number of financial aid awards that may be awarded during
a specified period;
(k) Forfeiture of all or a portion of the institution's share of the broad-based revenue
distribution monies for a specified period; (Adopted: 1/10/92) ...
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23, Bylaw art. 19.4.2 at 324.
29. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23, Administrative Bylaw, art. 32 at 425.
Also, for a flow-chart describing the processing of a typical infractions case, see Appendix A.
During enforcement proceedings, institutions have a responsibility to cooperate:
The enforcement procedures are an essential part of the intercollegiate athletic
program of each member institution and require full and complete disclosure by all
institutional representatives of any relevant information requested by the NCAA
irvestigative staff, Committee on Infractions or Council during the course of an
inquiry.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23, Bylaw art. 19.01.2 at 321; see also National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1988).
30. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23, Administrative Bylaw art. 32.2.2.3 at 427.
The enforcement staff, so far as practicable, shall make a thorough investigation of
all charges that are received from responsible sources and that are reasonably
substantial. The enforcement staff may conduct a preliminary inquiry for a
reasonable period of time to determine whether there is adequate evidence to warrant
an official inquiry; and in conducting this inquiry, the services of an enforcement
representative may be used.
Id.
31. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23, Administrative Bylaw art. 32.2.2.3 at 427.
32. Id. at art. 32.2.2.4 at 427.
33. Id. at art. 35.5.1 at 429. An NCAA official described the nature of an official inquiry
as follows:
Once the institution has collected all available information, it then meets with the
Committee on Infractions to discuss the information which it has obtained and
previously submitted to the Committee in writing. The purpose of this hearing before
the Committee on Infractions is for both the institution and the NCAA investigative
staff, for the first time, to present specific information to the Committee concerning
alleged violations of NCAA legislation. This procedure provides an adequate
opportunity for the institutional representatives to debate any of the information
presented to the Committee by the investigative staff or the institution, and to be
5
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inquiry, the enforcement staff sends a letter to the president of the institution
involved, listing all charges, suggesting a meeting date, and asking for
general cooperation. 4 Furthermore, the NCAA enforcement staff asks the
institution to independently investigate the allegations and report its findings
to the Committee on Infractions.35
Third, after the Committee issues the official inquiry, it conducts a pre-
hearing conference.' The pre-hearing conference includes the affected
individuals, the institution, and the NCAA staff.37 At the pre-hearing
conference, the Committee discloses all evidence it intends to use to support
the allegations in the official hearing." Also, the parties may review
memoranda and documents relating to the alleged infractions.39
Fourth, the Committee holds an official hearing.' At the official
hearing, institution representatives and affected parties may present argu-
ments and information to the Committee and contest the allegations.41 After
the official hearing, "the Committee issues written findings of violations and
recommends corrective action."4" Appeals may be taken to the NCAA
Council or to the full membership of the NCAA.43 However, no school has
advised of the source of the information upon which each allegation is based. Both
the Committee on Infractions and the University will be informed at the hearing of
the identity of the source of evidence upon which an allegation is based as well as
any actual details or evidence reported by individuals interviewed.
University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Nev. 1979), later proceeding, 741
P.2d 1345 (Nev. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
34. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23, Administrative Bylaw art. 32.5.1-32.5.1.1 at 429.
35. Id.






42. Id. The NCAA punishes member institutions and not individual representatives or
student athletes of the institution. Id.
Upon finding that misconduct by a member institution employee caused NCAA rules to be
violated, the Committee may require the institution to show cause why:
(i) a penalty or an additional penalty should not be imposed if, in the opinion of the
Committee ( or Council), it does not take appropriate disciplinary or corrective action
against athletic department personnel involved in the infractions case, any other
institutional employee if the circumstances warrant, or representatives of the
institution's athletic interests; or
(ii) a recommendation should not be made to the membership that the institution's
membership in the Association be suspended or terminated if, in the opinion of the
Committee ( or Council), it does not take appropriate disciplinary or corrective action
against the head coach of the sport involved, any other institutional employee if the
circumstances warrant, or representatives of the institution's athletic interests.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 184 n.7 (1988) (citation
omitted).
43. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1480.
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ever overturned an Infractions Committee penalty decision." Indeed, the
NCAA has a 100% conviction rate, finding at least one allegation in each
proceeding.'
B. The NCAA 's Enforcement Procedures in Practice
Because college sports now represent big business,' the pressure is
immense for coaches and boosters to recruit the best players in the world.
Accompanying this pressure comes the temptation to entice athletes with
cars, stereos, cash and even homes to play for their school. To deter
coaches and officials from succumbing to this temptation, the NCAA has an
enforcement staff "that can crisscross the country on an anonymous tip, to
determine if inducements were offered to a college recruit in violation of
NCAA rules."' Besides avoiding major violations, colleges and uni-
versities must guard against such seemingly trivial events as meeting a recruit
off-campus or giving the recruit a soft drink or a ride to the train station. 9
These types of actions can mean the loss of the school's eligibility to
participate in college athletics.'
However, according to one court, the NCAA is not only "an association
which exists for the purpose of seeing that there is fair play; it also has the
obligation to play fairly."51 As part of its duty to play fairly, the NCAA
itself realizes the necessity of guaranteeing schools procedural due pro-
cess.52 Nevertheless, by refusing to make changes in its investigative and
44. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 15.
45. Kevin M. McKenna, Courts Leave Legislatures to Decide the Fate of the NCAA in
Providing Due Process, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT LAW 77, 81 (1992) (citing YAEGER, supra note
3, at VIII.).
NCAA official Steve Morgan, speaking on the NCAA's 100% conviction rate, said "I
think that [conviction rate] really is reflective of the good work done by the enforcement staff
and the fact that, if we don't have a case, we don't try one." However, when told of Morgan's
quote, Nebraska Senator Ernie Chambers replied, "I think it [the conviction rate] reflects a
system that is stacked... From the moment they step on your campus to the time you lose your
appeal, the NCAA is in a no-lose situation. And for too long, we've all sat back and let them
work that way. It has got to stop. And I'm looking forward to being the one putting the brakes
on." YAEGER, supra note 3, at 247.
46. J. Steven Beckett, Law Tackles NCAA's Lack of 'Due Process,' CHICAGO DAILY LAW
BULLETIN, Wednesday, Feb. 12, 1992, at 5. CBS and the NCAA signed a 7 year $1 billion
contract for the rights to televise the NCAA college basketball tournament. Id. "Similarly, the





51. 1984 Preliminary Statement, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Opinion, Order and
Judgment at 16, University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d 1159 (Nev. 1979) [hereinafter
Order].
52. McKenna, supra note 45, at 98-99. In September of 1978, members of the NCAA's
infractions committee acknowledged that reforms to secure procedural due process for schools
were necessary. Id. Indeed, in 1991 the NCAA formed a Special Committee to Review the
7
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enforcement proceedings, the NCAA remains an unchecked power with the
capability of using any tactics it deems necessary to prosecute infractions
violations. A brief look at the history between the NCAA and Tarkanian
reflects the unfairness that permeates NCAA investigative and enforcement
procedures.
Tarkanian has long been a target of the NCAA. In the early 1970's,
while Tarkanian was coaching the Long Beach State 49ers, he wrote two
articles chastising the NCAA for investigating only smaller schools while
letting the "powerhouses" go free.53 Shortly thereafter, the NCAA investi-
gated the 49ers basketball team, with an end result of three years probation
for twenty-three rules violations.' When Tarkanian moved from Long
Beach State to UNLV, the NCAA Infractions Committee re-opened an
inactive investigation of UNLV scarcely six days after Tarkanian became a
UNLV "Runnin' Rebel." 55 After the NCAA followed Tarkanian from
Long Beach State to UNLV, Tarkanian and others became convinced the
NCAA had a vendetta against him.'
The subsequent NCAA investigations of Tarkanian and UNLV further
indicated the NCAA's prejudice against Tarkanian. In 1979, a Nevada state
trial court described the prejudice in detail.5 The court noted that the case
the NCAA presented against Tarkanian consisted of 100% hearsay without
a scrap of documentation to support the charges.5" "The Committee on
Infractions and its staff conducted a star chamber proceeding and a trial by
ambush against [Tarkanian]." 1 The court found the denial of Tarkanian's
due process rights exacerbated by a record "replete with lies, distortions and
half-truths. " ' Concluding, the court found "no legal credible evidence to
support the findings and actions of the NCAA." 1
In addition, a vivid example offered by the Nevada District Court
NCAA Enforcement Process consisting of leaders of the legal, athletic and educational communi-
ties. Id. The Special Committee proposed recommendations in October of 1991 offering an
accused additional due process protections including 1) the use of impartial judges as hearing
officers, 2) the preparation of enforcement hearing transcripts, and 3) safeguards to ensure
objective summarization of witnesses' testimony. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 13 n. 14. But, to
date none have been implemented in any proceeding. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 13.
53. YAEGER, supra note 3, at 200.,
54. Id. at 201.
55. Id. at 199.
56. Michael G. Dawson, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian: Supreme
Court Upholds NCAA 's Private Status Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Repelling Shark's
Attack on NCAA's Disciplinary Powers, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 217, 237 n.167 (1989) (citing J.
TARKANIAN & T. PLUTO, TARK-COLLEGE BASKETBALL's WINNINGEST COACH 160 (1988)).
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illustrated the NCAA's prejudice against Tarkanian.62 NCAA investigators
alleged that Tarkanian bought an airline ticket for a prospective basketball
star, "Jeep" Kelly, to fly from his home to Las Vegas, Nevada.' Even
though UNLV presented the ticket, an affidavit from Kelly's high school
coach stating he, the coach, paid for the ticket, and the coach's canceled
check showing payment, the NCAA nonetheless found Tarkanian guilty of
buying the ticket for Kelly.'
The Nevada District Court concluded "this case presents a classic
example of how misperception becomes suspicion, which in turn becomes
hostility, which leads, inevitably, to a deprivation of one's rights."' The
court characterized David Berst, one of the NCAA's investigators, as "a man
possessed and consumed with animosity toward Tarkanian."" Berst "swore
he would get Tarkanian if it was the last thing he ever did to act as in-
vestigator, judge and jury."67 In addition Berst inspired, authored and
drafted nearly all documented charges, findings, and sanctions against
Tarkanian.' "These practices might be considered 'efficient,' but so was
Adolph Eichmann and so is the Ayatollah."'
Not only did Nevada courts find shortcomings in the NCAA's enforce-
ment procedures, but so did the United States government. U.S. House of
Representatives Subcommittee examined the NCAA's enforcement program
in 1978. 7' The Subcommittee set out to investigate charges of unfairness
in the NCAA's enforcement process and found deficiency at the investiga-
tions and hearings levels.7"
At the NCAA's investigative stage, the Subcommittee found that
cooperation between the NCAA and member institutions did not exist, and
that investigations were "one-sided in the extreme."'" Furthermore,
member institutions were "put to unnecessary expense and trouble" and have
been subjected to inappropriate penalties.' Also, the NCAA produced "an
62. Order, supra note 51, at 14.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 11.
66. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 7.
67. Id. (citing University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 594 P.2d at 1160).
68. Order, supra note 51, at 13. Berst drafted in whole or in part "the NCAA prelimin'ary
investigation; the authority to issue an inquiry to UNLV; the Official Inquiry; the minutes of the
Committee on Infractions wherein the Committee's rules... appeared; the Confidential Report
of that Committee; the Findings and penalty imposed by that Committee; the Expanded
Confidential Report... used on appeal;and the order of the Council and the widely-promul-
gated press release about the supposed violations of NCAA's legislation." Id.
69. Order, supra note 51, at 14.
70. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter Report].
71. Id. at 25, 34.
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intolerable incidence of spurious and petty allegations."'" Member
institutions were "presumed guilty until proved innocent, which the Subcom-
mittee finds fatally offensive to its sense of fair play.'
In addition, the Subcommittee found equal problems with the hearing
phase.76 The hearing process lacked consistent evidentiary standards
essential to the fundamental fairness of the system. 7 The Subcommittee
found an irreconcilable conflict of interests among NCAA investigators who
acted as "investigators, prosecutors, judges, juries, and executioners all at the
same time."78 Significantly, the Subcommittee made its conclusions by
interviewing coaches and university officials intimidated by the NCAA's
power, and therefore reluctant to testify openly before the Subcommittee.79
However, even though the Subcommittee found glaring problems with
the NCAA's enforcement proceedings it passed no federal legislation.'
The Subcommittee refrained from passing legislation in exchange for the
NCAA's promise to make changes.8 However, nearly none of the defi-
ciencies found by the Subcommittee have been rectified.' Therefore,
Congress is once again considering the issue.3 The current query into the
fairness of NCAA practices started in August of 1991 at the session of the
Annual Meeting of the National Conference of State Legislatures entitled
"NCAA-Threat of Outside Intervention."' Congressional findings have
yet to be released.
Amidst the discontent with the NCAA's enforcement procedures, Nevada
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 34.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3. A representative for Mississippi State University stated: "... most member
institutions bow down without a whimper; those that stand up against the NCAA do so with
trembling and continuing fears of retaliatory retribution that can be dispensed without warning
by a powerful ann of arbitrary force." Id. (citing Enforcement Program of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
125 (1978) (statement of Erwin C. Ward, Attorney for Mississippi State University) [hereinafter
Hearings]. Also, a former Michigan State University assistant football coach expressed concern,
"I felt like I did not want my name associated with this hearing against the NCAA because I feel
like it has hurt my future in coaching and will continue to hurt my future in coaching.... I feel
like the administrators of this country are intimidated by the NCAA." Id. (citing Hearings at
127.) Even the NCAA president candidly admitted that "... . there are those who feel it unwise
to express their concerns about what has happened and about their impression of fairness by the
NCAA." Id. (citing Hearings at 195 (Mar. 14, 1978.))
80. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 13.
81. Id. (citing Trial Record 108, Reference I at 11-16; and Trial Record 108, Reference 11
at 55-59).
82. Id.
83. Brief of Amicus Curiae to the United States at 26 (citing H.R. 2157, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991)), National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Nev.
1992) (also on file with the California Western Law Review) [hereinafter B.A.C.].
84. Id. at 26 n.30. The moderator of the session was Don Yaeger. Id.
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passed its Due Process Statute. Indeed, Nevada was neither the first nor the
last to propose due process controls on the NCAA.1 Nebraska,' Flori-
da," and Illinois88 also have enacted due process statutes.' Such statutes
have also been introduced in Iowa,' California,9' Kansas, 92 South
Carolina?' and New York.'
C. Remedying the Situation
The Nevada Due Process Statute would remedy most of the problems
encountered between Tarkanian and the NCAA by forcing any national
collegiate athletic association to conform to basic standards of due process
within Nevada. For instance, the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses95 gives schools the capability of exposing untruthful witnesses
while also protecting against one-sided investigations by pointing out the gaps
in method and evidence collection. Furthermore, by requiring the NCAA to
support all rules violations findings by a preponderance of the evidence,'
spurious and petty allegations along with Kelly-type scenarios would be
disallowed. Also, the requirement of an impartial presiding person97 would
prevent men like Berst from acting as investigator, judge, and jury. Lastly,
by requiring a record of the proceedings, 98 judicial review,' and monetary
sanctions, 1" the NCAA would be forced to hold an accused innocent until
proven guilty. Then, only after guilt was established by a preponderance of
the evidence, could the NCAA impose appropriate sanctions on guilty
85. Supplemental Brief of Defendant Jerry Tarkanian, at 1, National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Nev. 1992) [hereinafter Supp. Brief].
86. "Nebraska Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures Act," NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-1201
to 85-1210 (1990).
87. "Collegiate Athletic Association Compliance Enforcement Procedures Act," FLA. ANN
STAT. §§ 240.5339-240.5349 (West 1992).
88. "Collegiate Athletic Association Compliance Enforcement Procedures Act," ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 144, para. 2901-2903 (Smith-Hurd 1991).
89. Supp. Brief, supra note 87, at 1-2.
90. Id. at 2 n.6 (citing Proposed new Section 266(a).1 et seq. introduced by Peterson,
Harbor & Siegrist into general assembly of the State of Iowa on March 11, 1991).
91. Id. at n.5 (citing Senate Bill No. 974 introduced by Senator Hill on March 8, 1991).
92. Id. at n.7 (citing Senate Bill No. 234 introduced by Senators Winter, et al., 1991).
93. Id. at n.8 (citing Assembly Bill to adopt the South Carolina Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tions Procedures Act).
94. Id. at n.9 (citing Proposed Section 6450-A et seq. of the Education Law introduced by
Senator Stafford in 1991).
95. NEV. REv. STAT. § 398.155(2) (1991).
96. Id. § 398.225(2). All evidence must be "of the type commonly relied upon by
reasonable and prudent men...." Id.
97. See id. § 398.195.
98. Id. § 398.165.
99. Id. § 398.215.
100. Id. § 398.245.
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parties.' 01 Therefore, because the Nevada Due Process Statute provides
Nevada schools with much needed protection, the Miller court's decision to
invalidate the statute must be scrutinized. A brief look at Commerce and
Contract Clause history Serves as a predicate to a description of how the
Nevada District Court arrived at its decision on June 5, 1992.
II. THE MILLER DECISION: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS AND RATIONALE
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause: Modern Application
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to "regulate Com-
merce ... among the several States . . .02 The Commerce Clause in
form and language affirmatively grants Congress the power to pass laws
limiting interstate commerce.' 3 However, even if Congress fails to pass
legislation, the negative implications of the Commerce Clause, commonly
called the Dormant Commerce Clause, still impose judicial limits on the
states' power."
The Dormant Commerce Clause allows the courts to strike down state
statutes that act as "barriers" to interstate commerce without sufficientjustification."~ Otherwise, states might impede the flow of commerce,
block free trade'channels, or damage the national market."° Nonetheless,
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state may still regulate interstate
commerce in certain areas.' 7 States may pass laws of local concern that
protect citizens from dangers to their health, safety, and welfare. 108 "As
long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to
'place itself in a position of economic isolation,' it retains broad regulatory
authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens.""
In analyzing a state statute under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the
Supreme Court has adopted a two-tiered approach, articulated in Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Authority."' First, a court
must ask if the statute discriminates against interstate commerce facially or
in effect."' A discriminatory statute is "one that overtly blocks the flow
101. Id. §§ 398.225(2)-(3).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
103. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1482.
104. Id. (citing Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)).
105. Sam Kalen, Reawakening The Dormant Commerce Clause In Its First Century, 13 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 417, 417 (1988).
106. Id.
107. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981).
108. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949).
109. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 18 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986)).
110. 476 U.S. 573, 578 (1986).
111. Id. at 579.
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of interstate commerce at a State's borders.""1 If the court finds dis-
crimination, it must strike down the statute unless there is no reasonable,
nondiscriminatory alternative for accomplishing the State's legitimate
goals."' However, if the court finds no discrimination, then it applies the
Pike"" balancing test. 15
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the putative local benefits.... If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of
the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities. 116
Courts applying the Pike test must first determine whether the statute
serves a legitimate local public interest." 7  If not, the query ends and the
statute is unconstitutional." 8 However, if the statute does serve a legiti-
mate local public interest, the court must next determine whether the burden
on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits." 9 If the burdens
on interstate commerce clearly outweigh the benefits, then the court voids the
statute."2° But if the burdens do not clearly exceed the local benefits, then
the statute will withstand Commerce Clause analysis, retaining constitution-
112. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1483 (citing Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metro. Serv. Dist., 820
F.2d 1482, 1488 (9th Cir. 1987)).
113. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
114. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
115. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579.
116. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The case itself illustrates how the balancing is done. In Pike,
the defendant company grew cantaloupes in Arizona and shipped them to California to be sorted,
inspected, and packed in containers bearing the name of the California packer. Id. at 137. The
Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act required that "fruits and vegetables shipped
from Arizona meet certain standards of wholesomeness and quality, and that they be packed in
standard containers in such a way that the outer layer or exposed portion of the pack does not
'materially misrepresent' the quality of the lot as a whole. The impetus for the Act was the fear
that some growers were shipping inferior or deceptively packaged produce, with the result that
the reputation of Arizona growers generally was being tarnished and their financial return
concomitantly reduced." Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted). The plaintiff, acting under a statute
designed to prevent deceptive packaging, sued the defendant requiring him to identify the canta-
loupes as of Arizona origin. Id. The issue was whether the statute forcing the defendant to
build packing facilities in Arizona to label the cantaloupes at a cost of $200,000 was
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court held the statute
unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 145. The Court employed a
balancing test and reasoned that Arizona's minimal interest in identifying Arizona cantaloupes
to enhance the reputation of Arizona producers did not outweigh the burden of requiring the
defendant producer to build, at substantial capital expense, a packaging plant that it did not need.
Id. at 137.
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The limitations of balancing tests are well known. As with any burden-
benefit balancing approach, the court faces a difficult task. "Even expert
economists might be hard-pressed to determine whether the overall economic
benefits and burdens of a state regulation favor local inhabitants or outsid-
ers." 1' Indeed, individual Justices have recently questioned the theoretical
underpinnings of the "balancing test. " "
B. The Contract Clause
The Contract Clause provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass
any... Laws impairing the obligation of Contracts.. . ." The drafters
of the Contract Clause intended to prevent state legislatures from interfering
with contracts between private citizens by relieving debtors of their obligation
to pay creditors."z However, although the language of the Contract Clause
seems absolute, a state may pass legislation that safeguards the vital interests
of its people." The general rule is that even if a statute substantially
impairs the contract, the statute is constitutional if it is reasonable and
121. Id.
122. Russell Chapin, Chadha, Garcia and the Dormant Commerce Clause Limitation on
State Authority to Regulate, 23 URB. 163, 168 (Spring 1991). "Thus, the Court reserves the
right to pick and choose among the various tests and touchstones to arrive at the result it wishes
to achieve. Consistency . . .is not the hallmark of adjudication in this area of the law." Id.
at 169.
123. Kalen, supra note 105, at 419. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481
U.S. 69 (1987), Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion that the Pike balancing test "is
ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all." Kalen, supra note
105, at 419 (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987)).
Furthermore, Scalia reiterated his view with Chief Justice Rehnquist in Tyler Pipe Industries v.
Washington Department of Revenue 107 S. Ct. 2810 (1987), where he mentioned that
historically, dormant commerce clause analysis lacked theoretical underpinning in the Consti-
tution. Kalen, supra note 105, at 419 (citing Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington Department
of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2826 (1987) (citations omitted)). In Tyler, Scalia noted:
[tihe fact is that the 114 years since the doctrine of the negative Commerce Clause
was formally adopted as holding of this Court, and in the 50 years prior to that in
which it was alluded to in various dicta by the Court, our applications of the doctrine
have, not to put too fine a point on the matter, made no sense.
Id. Scalia's opinion in Tyler was "perhaps the most critical remark on the dormant commerce
clause to date by a sitting Justice" which "may prove to be the prelude to a new jurisprudence."
Id. Scalia argued that the Court should not use the balancing test, but rather should look at state
statutes under clause IV of the Constitution using a privileges and immunities analysis. Id.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
125. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONALLAW 395 (4th ed. 1991).
Specifically, the primary focus of the Contract Clause "was upon legislation that was designed
to repudiate or adjust pre-existing debtor-creditor relationships that obligors were unable to
satisfy." Id.
126. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983)(citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934)).
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necessary in achieving a vital public purpose."z
The initial inquiry in determining if a statute violates the Contract Clause
is whether the statute "substantially impairs" the contractual relationship.1"
"Substantial impairment" occurs only when the statute imposes a loss on the
other party.1 If only a small impairment exists, the inquiry may end and
the statute is constitutional.13 Even if a statute substantially impairs a
contractual agreement, the statute is constitutional if it is both reasonable and
necessary to achieve an important public purpose."' The "reasonableness"
element concentrates on what the legitimate expectations of the parties were
when they entered into the agreement.132  The "necessary" requirement
focuses on whether an obvious and less damaging alternative would serve the
state's interest just as well. 3 If the statute is both reasonable and nec-
essary under this analysis, then it is constitutional.
III. NCAA v. MIL=ER
A. The Situation Leading to Miller's Rejection
of the Nevada Due Process Statute
The NCAA received information of possible rule violations at UNLV
and after a preliminary inquiry, the NCAA Committee on Infractions"
sent an official inquiry to UNLV in late 1990 describing recruitment
violations of Lloyd Daniels. 3 ' Daniels was identified as a suspect in the
theft of Final Four basketball tickets from UNLV and allegedly received
cash, a car, and a motorcycle to play for the Rebels." Subsequently, both
the NCAA and UNLV conducted separate investigations of the UNLV
intercollegiate basketball program.137 During that time, NCAA investiga-
tors also reviewed the recruitment of Ed O'Bannon. 135 The O'Bannon in-
127. United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
128. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978).
129. Id. at 244-47.
130. Id. at 245.
131. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411.
132. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 31-32.
133. Id. at 31.
134. The NCAA Committee on Infractions runs the enforcement program by controlling an
investigative staff, determining facts relating to any possible rules violations, and penalizing
schools that violate the rules. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1480.
135. Status, supra note 3, at A40. On December 18, 1990, the NCAA charged UNLV with
29 rules violations, many of them major. Id.
136. YAEGER, supra note 3, at 232.
137. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1480. The university released a secretly made videotape of
a conditioning class taught by a UNLV basketball coach that allegedly shows the team practicing
before the season started officially. Status, supra note 3, at A40.
138. Status, supra note 3, at A40. Ed O'Bannon never ended up playing for UNLV.
Instead, he accepted a scholarship at UCLA (University of California at Los Angeles) and as of
February 1992 plays forward for the UCLA Bruins basketball team. Id.
1993]
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vestigation resulted in an official charge of rules violations against UNLV
which was mailed on July 2, 1991.139
As a result of the investigations, near the end of July 1991, the
Committee notified UNLV of the prehearing conference and official hearing
scheduled for September 1991.1° However, Tarkanian notified the NCAA
that any hearing appearance would be conditioned upon the NCAA comply-
ing with the Nevada Due Process Statute enacted into law on April 8,
1991.141 Specifically, Tarkanian demanded:
(1) that at least thirty (30) days prior to the prehearing conference the
NCAA give each defendant copies of all documents the NCAA intends to
rely upon or use in any manner; (2) that each defendant be given the
opportunity to confront all witnesses; (3) that the NCAA provide the defen-dants all exculpatory statements obtained by the NCAA; (4) that theCommittee on Infractions is not impartial and that an independent and
impartial entity be selected to adjudicate the facts and corrective actions;(5) that all proceedings of the NCAA hearing be open to the public,
recorded andtranscribed; and (6) that all other provisions of [the Nevada
Due Process Statute] be followed.142
With their investigation and enforcement methods challenged, and four years
of investigation on the line, the NCAA rallied their cause to the courtroom
and filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief.143 The NCAA implored
the court to (1) declare the Nevada statute void and (2) restrain and enjoin
Tarkanian from taking any action to enforce or seek protection under the
provisions of the statute.1"4
In response, Tarkanian contended that under NCAA rules, an accused
faces loss of livelihood, revenue, and reputation, without such basic due
process protections as a transcript of his disciplinary hearings, an unbiased
hearing officer, a right to confront accusers, or an opportunity for a mea-
ningful appeal.14 Tarkanian argued that "the Nevada Due Process Statute
was enacted for a very serious purpose-to curb the pernicious effects of
allowing national collegiate athletic associations, such as the NCAA,
unfettered freedom in conducting 'star chamber' proceedings."" Tarka-
nian concluded that without the protection of the Due Process Statute, the
139. Id.
140. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1480.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1481.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1479, 1488.
145. Supp. Brief, supra note 84, at 3. "The large number of affected Nevada citizens
include the 11,714 students and approximately 1,000 employees at the University of Nevada at
Reno, the 19,504 students and 1,870 employees at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, as well
as untold thousands of alumni from these institutions, and the hundreds of thousands of fans or
'boosters' of Nevada college sports." Id.
146. Supp. Brief, supra note 84, at 25.
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NCAA's unfair practices would result in the tarnishing of "the reputations
of all those directly and indirectly connected with a Nevada member
institution athletic program, disrupt the participation in and enjoyment of
college sports programs, and end the careers of coaches and other university
employees as well as rising young student-athletes."147
Despite Tarkanian's arguments, the Nevada District Court held the
Nevada Due Process Statute violated the Commerce Clause and Contract
Clause of the United States Constitution, 148 and ruled the Nevada statute
invalid and unenforceable against the NCAA. 149 Furthermore, the court
restrained and enjoined Tarkanian from taking any action to enforce or seek
protection under the Nevada Due Process Statute."5
B. Discussion: The Miller Court's Constitutional Analysis
1. The Commerce Clause
The district court began its Commerce Clause analysis by asking the
threshold question of whether the regulatory activities of the NCAA involved
"interstate commerce for purposes of Commerce Clause protection in light
of the educational objectives of the NCAA."151 The court noted that while
the participating athletes may be amateurs, the management of intercollegiate
athletics is business, and "big business at that." 52 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the conduct of the athletic programs between the NCAA and its
member institutions significantly involved interstate commerce and triggered
implication of the Commerce Clause.1 53
147. Id.
148. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1488. Besides arguing that the Nevada statute violated the
Commerce and Contract Clauses of the Constitution, the NCAA also contended that (1) "the
statute arbitrarily deprives the NCAA and its members of the right to freely associate with each
other to maintain their intercollegiate athletic programs in violation of the First Amendment" and
that (2) "the statute contains provisions which are vague and overbroad in violation of the Due
Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 1479. The last two issues were
undecided by the court because their resolution would not alter the relief granted to the NCAA.
Id. at 1488.
149. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1488.
150. Id. Also, the court had stayed consideration of certain counterclaims by Jerry Tarkani-
an and his wife, Lois Tarkanian, pending a resolution of this case. Thus, the court vacated that
stay. Id.
151. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1482.
152. Id. (citing Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977)).
153. Id. (citing Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1150 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Banks
v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 857 (N.D. Ind. 1990)). The court stated that a close look at the
NCAA bears its conclusion out:
The NCAA conducts seventy-six (76) annual NCAA championship events throughout
the United States involving member teams and individual student athletes from across
the country. The games and tournaments scheduled by the NCAA necessitate the
transportation of teams across state lines. In addition, the NCAA controls bids in-
volving hundreds of millions of dollars for interstate television broadcasting of
17
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The court erred, however, by focusing entirely on the NCAA's
"economic" activities and not on the "social" nature of the Nevada Due
Process Statute." The U.S. Supreme Court gives priority to legislation
regarding social issues over economic issues. 55 The Nevada Due Process
Statute provides for "the social concern of providing minimum due process
rights to Nevada state employees and others accused in an NCAA infractions
case."156 Furthermore, even the NCAA argued successfully in the past that
its rules "are not designed to generate profits in a commercial activity but to
preserve amateurism by assuring that the recruitment of student athletes does
not become a commercial activity."157 The NCAA argued that its "eligibil-
ity rules have purely or primarily non-commercial objectives.""' There-
fore, if the NCAA considered its own enforcement rules "purely non-com-
mercial," then those of the Nevada Due Process Statute are equally so.'
Nonetheless, finding the Commerce Clause applicable, the court next
considered whether the Nevada statute violated the Commerce Clause. t6°
The court applied the two-tiered analysis articulated in Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Authority.' First, the court consid-
ered whether the Nevada law directly discriminated against interstate
commerce or amounted to "economic protectionism" making the statute per
se invalid. 62 The court determined that the statute did not facially or directly
discriminate against interstate commerce, nor did it sound of economic pro-
intercollegiate sports events. Finally, collegiate recruiting of perspective team
members takes place on a national and even international scale and the NCAA strictly
regulates this recruiting activity. As the Supreme Court has held ... the "product"
marketed by the NCAA is intercollegiate competition. Accordingly, the court
concludes that the national scope of the NCAA's activities are sufficient to establish
the requisite interstate involvement under the Commerce Clause.
Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1482 (citations omitted).
154. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 19.
155. Id. (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2491, 2501 (1989) (stating that even
overt discrimination against interstate trade may be justified in cases of social welfare); Breard
v. Alexandria, La., 341 U.S. 622, 640, (1951) ("[w]here there is a reasonable basis for
legislation to protect the social, as distinguished from the economic, welfare of a community,
it is not for [the federal courts] because of the Commerce Clause to deny the exercise locally
of the sovereign power of [the state]").
156. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 20.
157. B.A.C., supra note 83, at I (citing Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990)).
158. Id. at 1 n.3 (citing MeConnack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988)).
159. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 21.
160. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1483.
161. Id.; see Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573(1986).
162. Id. If the statute was directly discriminatory, amounting to economic protectionism,
then the statute would be considered per se invalid under the Commerce Clause. Id. (citing City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978); Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metro.
Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987); Valley Bank of Nev. v. Plus Systems, Inc., 914
F.2d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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tectionism. 13  This conclusion is correct. In Miller, the situation was
definitely unlike cases in which the state sought to advantage its own com-
peting commercial enterprises," or close off its borders from interstate
commerce. 165
More troublesome, however, is the court's employment of the Pike"
balancing test and its determination that any burden on interstate commerce
outweighed the statute's benefit. 67 In holding that the statute's benefits
were outweighed by the harm to the uniform enforcement of NCAA regula-
tions throughout the country,"' the court committed serious errors. First,
the court gave inadequate attention to the benefits resulting from the statute.
The court should have acknowledged that the Nevada Due Process Statute
makes NCAA procedures for determining violations fair to Nevada students,
school employees, schools, and the institutions' communities." Also, the
Nevada Statute benefits student athletes and school employees by protecting
their reputations, means to make a livelihood, and personal and professional
aspirations. 1" Furthermore, the statute protects Nevada institutions from
crippling financial loss that would severely disrupt their athletics programs
163. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1483. The court also added that the Nevada statute did not
overtly block the flow of interstate commerce at Nevada's borders. The Nevada Due Process
Statute only attempted to require the NCAA to comply with minimum due process standards
when investigating Nevada schools. Id.
164. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). In
Hunt, North Carolina enacted a statute which required that "all closed containers of apples sold,
offered for sale, or shipped into the State to bear 'no grade other than the applicable U.S. grade
or standard.'" Id. at 335. The Washington State Apple Advertising Commission challenged the
statute on the ground that it violated the Commerce Clause. Id. The Washington "legislature
has undertaken to protect and enhance the reputation of Washington apples by establishing a
stringent, mandatory inspection program... [in all cases, the Washington State grades ... are
the equivalent of, or superior to, the comparable grades and standards adopted by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA)." Id. at 336. The court invalidated the North
Carolina statute because 1) it raised the cost of doing business for Washington growers and 2)
the statute stripped the Washington apple industry of the competitive and economic advantages
it had earned by its high grade system. Id. at 351-52. "By requiring Washington apples to be
sold under the inferior grades ... the North Carolina statute offers the North Carolina apple
industry the very sort of protection against out-of-state competition that the Commerce Clause
was designed to prohibit." Id. at 334.
165. See generally Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that New
Jersey's law that prohibited the importation into the state of solid or liquid wastes, in order to
protect the public, health, safety, and welfare violated the Commerce Clause because New Jersey
sought to close off its borders from interstate commerce).
166. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (describing the holding in Pike).
167. See Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1483. The court "must first identify the state's interests
in its legislation, ensure that those interests are legitimate, and then determine whether the state
law imposes an excessive burden on interstate commerce in relation to those legitimate inter-
ests." Id. (citing Valley Bank of Nev. v. Plus Sys., Inc., 914 F.2d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir.
1990)).
168. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1485.
169. These arguments are taken from the body of the Illinois Act, supra note 89, Par.
2902(i). Because the Illinois and the Nevada statute primarily fight for the same things,
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and directly lessen local taxpayer support to the institutions.17 ' Although
the court did correctly note that "the enactment of the statute is to afford
basic due process safeguards to the careers, livelihoods, and reputations of
all Nevadans, including students and employees of Nevada NCAA member
institutions, the alumni of these institutions, and the fans and boosters of
Nevada intercollegiate sports,""7 it failed to evaluate the importance of
these interests. Noting that they were "matters of legitimate local public
interest,"" 7 the court quickly concluded that even though a statute may
address interests of legitimate concern, these interests may be void if the
burden on interstate commerce is clearly "excessive in relation to the local
interests served by the statute." 74  The court reasoned that the statute
prevented the evenhanded application of NCAA enforcement procedures
because the statute required cross-examination of all witnesses, required an
impartial hearing officer, required NCAA compliance before sanctioning
Nevada schools, and controlled commerce outside its borders. 75 Had the
court truly weighed these interests, it would have found that the burdens did
not clearly outweigh the benefits. 76 The Nevada Due Process Statute does
remedy a public concern."7 When the NCAA investigates Nevada institu-
tions and issues unfair sanctions against them, all Nevadan taxpayers directly
shoulder the financial burden of lost income from sporting events.17 1
Furthermore, distinguished coaching careers may be curtailed because of un-
fair NCAA sanctions. 79 Indeed, as argued in an amicus brief, the statute
does not subject the NCAA "to formidable or burdensome requirements;
rather, the provisions of [the Nevada Due Process Statute] . . .merely
impose rules guaranteeing the common concepts of notice, an opportunity to
be heard, cross-examination, an impartial adjudicator and punishment con-
sistent with that dispensed for like violations."" s Admittedly, these local
interests do not rise to the level of the prevention of food contamination'
or traffic deaths." However, even if the court's underplaying of the
benefits of the Nevada Due Process Statute was more appropriate, the court
committed a significant error by over-valuing the burdens in several ways.
171. See id.
172. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1483. Tarkanian contends that the impetus for the statute is
a concern that "coaches will not receive a fair hearing consistent with notions of due process and
fundamental fairness" if the existing NCAA rules are used in subsequent investigations. Id.
173. Id. at 1483.
174. Id. at 1484 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
175. Id. at 1484-85.
176. See B.A.C., supra note 83, at 4.
177. See id. at 7.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 7, n.10.
181. See, e.g., Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
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The court decided that the Nevada law required procedures both
substantially different than the NCAA bylaws and significantly burdensome
on the NCAA's goal of maintaining a "level playing field. " s First, the
court noted that Section 398.155(2) of the statute provides investigatees the
right to cross-examine witnesses.'" The court determined that because the
NCAA lacks the power to subpoena witnesses, "an infractions proceeding
could not practicably be processed in compliance with the provisions of the
Nevada statute. " "a
The court's subpoena power argument fails for several reasons. The
NCAA already has substantial power to compel witnesses to testify.
Coaches, athletes and administrators already have a commitment to cooperate
with the NCAA, and failure to testify before the NCAA enforcement staff
can be a violation of the cooperation clause.s For a coach this may mean
NCAA banishment, or for an athlete, the loss of eligibility."s The NCAA
acknowledges this power, but argues that one important group remains
unaffected by the cooperation clause, namely the boosters.188 Nonetheless,
the NCAA can remedy the booster problem by requiring each university to
sign contracts with everyone, including members of the booster club,
requiring complete cooperation during NCAA investigations.8 9 If boosters
failed to cooperate, the contract could provide for school sanctions and per-
sonal disassociation from the university."9
Additionally, the NCAA can get subpoena power. One alternative for
the NCAA to is to go to the state legislatures and just ask for subpoena pow-
er. 1 ' Another alternative would be for the NCAA to link its procedures
with those of local law enforcement people."9 "If those potential NCAA
witnesses were threatened with time in jail if they didn't answer,
183. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1484.
184. Id. "A party to a proceeding ... is entitled to confront and respond to all witnesses
and evidence related to the allegation against him. ... " NEv. REv. STAT. § 398.155(2) (1991).
185. Id.
186. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23, at 32.3.11 at 428.
187. YAEGER, supra note 3, at 261.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 262.
190. Id. The contract "could even extend to alums, that to be a member of the booster club,
to be involved in athletics in any way, you must sign a contract that says you will cooperate with
the NCAA and the NCAA has the authority to go into court to force you to cooperate if you
don't. And if you fail to cooperate the university could be sanctioned, and you still be
automatically disassociated from the program. It's like a contempt citation." Id.
191. Id. Duke University sports law professor John Weisert feels that the NCAA's
complaint that it does not have subpoena power "bothers him for at least one reason: They've
never asked for it. 'If they wanted to be truly effective ... the easiest thing to do would be to
go to Congress . . . and ask for subpoena power .... The fact that they've never requested
subpoena power, in my mind, means they shouldn't be using the lack of subpoena power as an
excuse for bad enforcement."' Id. at 241, 243-44.
192. Id. at 262.
1993]
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then... you'd get a much more thorough, a much more complete
investigation." 1" However, the NCAA has avoided seeking official
subpoena power because the NCAA fears legislatures might require them to
abide by due process requirements in exchange."
Second, similarly questionable is the court's discussion of Section
398.195 of the Nevada statute, which required that hearings be conducted by
an impartial hearing officer.19 The court stated that the NCAA cannot
comply with this provision because only membership at conventions may
change the hearing officer from the Committee on Infractions to an impartial
observer."9 In other words, the court says that because the Nevada Statute
conflicts with the NCAA's rules, the statute is invalid. However, the court
used circular reasoning to reach this conclusion. Obviously, state law over-
rules a private association's regulations. If the court declared the statute
valid, the statute would certainly "preempt" a private association's by-laws,
here, the NCAA's. Therefore, just because the NCAA has its own rules
does not make them presumptively immune to state statutory law.
Third, the court erred by finding that Section 398.235(2) burdens
interstate commerce. The section abdicates the NCAA's right to expel
Nevada institutions unless the NCAA abides by the terms of the statute. The
court noted the NCAA "would likely be reluctant to use its resources to
enforce rules evenhandedly in the several venues in this country," because
this provision would "strip the NCAA of the authority to freely adopt its own
procedural regulations." 19' But once again, the District court seems to
ignore the fact that state laws almost always affect, and sometimes limit,
private power. In and of itself, this is not a sufficient basis for a dormant
commerce clause challenge. For example, in Exxon Corp.,"' the court
found that a state statute affected private power and business decisions, but
held that "interstate commerce is not subjected to an impermissible burden
simply because an otherwise valid regulation causes some business to shift
193. Id.
194. Id.
Or try this. When a school goes under investigation, the NCAA could require the
institution the booster club or whatever to post a substantial bond that would be
forfeited if someone does not cooperate. The idea is used on other places-that's
what states are doing now with athletic agents, making them post bond, and if they
violate rules they lose money under the bond. That's a powerful incentive to
cooperate, if the university is going to lose big money.
Id.
195. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1484.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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from one interstate supplier to another." 1" In other words, just because
a state statute affects private power does not make the statute unconstitutional
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Miller court did not explain how
prohibiting the NCAA from imposing sanctions on schools, unless the NCAA
complies with the Nevada Due Process Statute, creates a substantial burden
on interstate commerce.
Finally, the court closely examined the state law in light of its effects on
interstate commerce outside its borders.' The court concluded that the
extraterritorial effect of the statute was substantial because it "severely
restricts the NCAA from establishing uniform rules to govern and enforce
interstate collegiate practices associated with intercollegiate athletics. " "°l
The fact that other states might have adopted different legislation meant that
the NCAA would be precluded from having a uniform rule and procedural
basis for conducting its investigations.'
Nonetheless, the court's uniformity argument is irrelevant to Commerce
Clause analysis because the NCAA seeks to merely protect its own method
of operation, rather than an interstate market.' The facts of the Miller
case parallel those in Exxon Corp.' In Exxon Corp., Exxon challenged
a state statute prohibiting them from owning and operating gas stations in
199. Id. at 127-28. In Exxon Corp., the appellants argued ineffectively that because the
Maryland statute would cause at least three refiners to stop selling in Maryland which would
"deprive the consumer of certain special services." Id. The court concluded that "[e]ven if we
assume the truth of both assertions, neither warrants a finding that the statute impermissibly
burdens interstate commerce." Id. The court continued:
Some refiners may choose to withdraw entirely from the Maryland market, but there
is no reason to assume that their share of the entire supply will not be promptly
replaced by other interstate refiners. The source of the consumers' supply may
switch from company-operated stations to independent dealers, but interstate
commerce is not subjected to an impermissible burden simply because an otherwise
valid regulation causes some business to shift from one interstate supplier to
another .... It may be true that the consuming public will be injured by the loss of
the high-volume, low-priced stations operated by the independent refiners, but that
argument relates to the wisdom of the statute, not to its burden commerce.
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978).
200. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1484 (citing Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982);
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Healy v.
Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989)).
201. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1484. The state law would force the NCAA to adopt the
procedures of the statute thus allowing the Nevada Legislature to dictate enforcement pro-
ceedings outside Nevada. Id. at 1484-85. Further:
the practical effect of the statute must be evaluated by considering the consequences
of the statute itself, but also in considering how the challenged statute may interact
with the legitimate regulatory schemes of other states and what effect would arise of
not one, but many or every, state adopted similar legislation.
Id. (citing Healy, 491 U.S. at 336).
202. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1485.
203. See A.O.B., supra note 5, at 21.
204. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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Maryland.2 5 Exxon argued that other state legislatures had enacted or were
planning to enact similar legislation and that the cumulative effect would
damage the national uniformity of Exxon's marketing operations.' Thus,
Exxon argued that "because the economic market for petroleum products is
nationwide, no state has the power to regulate the retail marketing of
gas."2
7
However, in upholding the statute, the Court held that the Commerce
Clause "protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from
prohibitive or burdensome regulations."208 More significantly, the Court
upheld the statute even though "many legislatures [had] either enacted or
considered proposals similar to Maryland's."0 9 The Exxon Court noted
that Exxon was not afraid that other states would enact differing legislation,
but rather that different states would enact legislation similar to the Maryland
statute prohibiting them from owning and operating gas stations within state
boundaries.210 Similarly, in Miller, "the evil that the NCAA perceives is
not that other states will enact differing legislation, but rather that the states
will all conclude that the NCAA's existing enforcement rules fail to provide
minimum due process procedures for those accused of NCAA rule viola-
tions. "211
2. The Contract Clause
The Miller court used a three step approach in its analysis of the
Contract Clause claim.2"2 First, the court asked if a contract existed
between the parties.2 Second, finding a contract did exist, the court then
asked if the Nevada Due Process Statute substantially impaired the contractu-
al relationship between the NCAA and Nevada schools.214 Third, after
concluding the statute substantially impaired the contractual relationship, the
court analyzed whether the impairment was both reasonable and necessary
to attain a valid state interest.2 5 The court held the Nevada Statute unnec-
essary to achieve a valid state interest, thus invalidating the statute under a
205. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 22 (citing Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 128).
206. Id.
207. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 128.
208. Id. at 127-28 (emphasis added).
209. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 128. The court noted that while "California, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, and Florida [had] adopted laws restricting refiners' operation of service
stations," legislatures in thirty-two other jurisdictions had considered similar proposals. Id. at
128 n.18.
210. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 23.
211. Id. at 25.
212. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1485-88.
213. Id. at 1485.
214. Id. at 1486.
215. Id. at 1487.
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Contract Clause analysis." 6
First, the court asked whether a contract existed between NCAA and
UNLV. 17 In determining a contract existed, the court reasoned when
UNLV became an NCAA member in 1958 it received the benefits and
privileges flowing from membership. 18 In exchange, the UNLV agreed
to follow the NCAA's conditions of membership, including all enforcement
procedures laid out in the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws.219 Therefore,
the court concluded a contractual relationship existed sufficient to trigger the
Contract Clause.'
Assuming a contract between UNLV and the NCAA existed, although
some arguments exist to the contrary,221 it may not have fallen within the
scope of the Contract Clause because of its subject matter. 2  The Contract
Clause was intended to prevent legislative schemes that would defeat or
adjust debtor-creditor relationships and contractual obligations.' The
"obligations" that the Contract Clause typically protects relate to "insolven-
cy, property rights, eminent domain, taxation or other economic inter-
ests."2 However, any contract that exists between the NCAA and UNLV
falls outside these categories and governs noneconomic activity.' The
NCAA rules are not designed to generate profits in a commercial activi-
ty,' indeed, the eligibility rules have a purely non-commercial objec-
216. Id. at 1488.
217. Id. at 1486.
218. Id.
219. Id. (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 23, Const. art. 1.3.2.).
220. Id.
221. One commentator said that as a prerequisite for membership in the NCAA, all
members "contractually" agree to conduct their athletic program in conformity with NCAA rules
and regulations. Kevin M. McKenna, The Tarkanian Decision: The State of College Athletics
is Everything but State Action, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 459, 473 (1991). However, while there
exists some evidence that a contract existed between the NCAA and UNLV, the court may have
erred in finding one. See A.O.B., supra note 5, at 34. UNLV does not have any recognizable
legal existence under Nevada law enabling it to contract with the NCAA because "UNLV is
merely a branch of the University of Nevada System without any independent legal or corporate
existence." Id. at 34-35. Section 396.020 of the Nevada Revised Statutes says that "[t]he
system of universities, colleges, research and public service units administered under the
direction of the board of regents shall collectively be known as the University of Nevada Sys-
tem." Id. at 34 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 396.020). Within this statute, university employees
do not enter into contracts for UNLV, but the "University of Nevada System." Therefore, be-
cause UNLV is merely a branch of the University of Nevada System and has no legal
significance, it does not have the power to enter into a contract with the NCAA. Id.
222. B.A.C., supra note 83, at 22.
223. See id. (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934)).
224. B.A.C., supra note 83, at 23 (citing Annotation, State's Exercise of Police Power as
Constituting Impairment of Obligation of Private Contract in Violation of Contract Clause of
Federal Constitution-Supreme Court Cases, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1279 (1977)).
225. See B.A.C., supra note 83, at 23.
226. See B.A.C., supra note 83, at I (citing Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743
(M.D. Tenn. 1990)).
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tive.m On this basis, because the contract between the NCAA and UNLV
involves non-commercial or non-economic activity, the Contract Clause
probably should not be applied.
Next, the court found that the statute substantially impaired the
contractual relationship between the NCAA and Nevada member institu-
tions." The court reasoned the NCAA would face pecuniary sanctions if
it did not follow the Nevada Due Process Statute. 9 The court believed the
threat of monetary sanctions restricted NCAA enforcement proceedings and
gave UNLV an unfair competitive advantage over out-of-state schools.'
In the court's view, this allowed UNLV to circumvent the contractual
requirements with the NCAA. 31 Therefore, the court held that the statute
substantially impaired the contractual relationship between UNLV and the
NCAA. 232
Nonetheless, the court erred by concluding that the statute substantially
impaired any contract between UNLV and the NCAA. 33 The Nevada Due
Process Statute only affects the enforcement mechanism of the contract,'"
and not the contractual obligations, and therefore only modifies the NCAA's
remedy. 35 The obligation is based upon a myriad of substantive behavior,
including, the rules by which the games are played, standards of amateurism,
standards for academic eligibility, regulations concerning recruitment of
athletes and rules governing the size of athletic squads and coaching
staffs.' The Court decided in In re Penniman 7 that two issues must
be addressed when considering the constitutionality of a procedural
modification of a contractual remedy: 1) does the action deny a remedy and,
2) does the action seriously impair the value of the contractual remedy to the
point no substantial remedy remains.38 First, in Miller, the Nevada Due
Process Statute does not deny a remedy because "the power to enforce the
substantive regulations and the power to discipline violations remain in full
force." 39 Second, when the court examines whether a substantial remedy
227. Id. at 1 n.3 (citing McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988)).





233. B.A.C., supra note 83, at 23.
234. Id. at 24.
235. Id. at 23.
236. See id. (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 85, 88 (1984)).
237. 103 U.S. 714 (1880). In re Penninan was quoted in Thorpe v. Housing Authority,
393 U.S. 268 (1969) and acknowledged In re LaFortune, 652 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1981).
B.A.C., supra note 83, at 24 n.27.
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remains, it decides each case on its own circumstances' and "[i]n all such
cases the question becomes one of reasonableness, and of that the legislature
is primarily the judge."2" Regarding the Nevada Due Process Statute, the
Nevada Legislature determined that it was reasonable to require national
collegiate athletic associations to be fair when enforcing their rules. 2
Therefore, because the statute does not deny the NCAA remedy, or seriously
impair the value of the contractual remedy to the point no substantial remedy
remains, the Nevada Statute is arguably valid under the Contract Clause.
Lastly, the court determined the contractual impairment was not
necessary to achieve an important public purpose. 3 While the court
conceded the statute represented a legitimate exercise of the state's police
power," it determined the statute did not rise to the level necessary to
protect the health and safety of the Nevada people.4 5 The court reasoned
the statute fell short of the necessary requirement for two reasons. First, the
statute was not designed to solve a broad societal problem.' The court
explained that the statute specifically targeted the NCAA to give Nevada
institutions unequal treatment, thus contradicting the initial contract
promoting a fair and level playing field. 7  This fact is somewhat irrele-
vant. The court erred by looking to the pointed mechanism, rather than the
broad concerns solved as a result of the statute." Furthermore, the court
reasons that because the Nevada statute affects only its state and those laws
in it the Nevada schools get unequal treatment. 9 But the court fails to ac-
knowledge that all Nevada laws affect only Nevada and those entities
operating in Nevada. Therefore, by the court's own analysis, a state statute
could never survive Contracts Clause requirements because state statutes
serve to protect the interests of those within the borders of the state.
Additionally, the Miller court found the Nevada Due Process statute not
necessary because: 1) Tarkanian, in conjunction with the NCAA and other
member schools, could modify the procedural rules of NCAA enforcement
proceedings by amending the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws, and 2)
240. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 554
(1876)).
241. Id. (citing Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775 (1883) (emphasis added)).
242. Id. (citing Legislative findings at 1991 NEV. STAT. ch. 55 § 1, at 10).
243. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1488.
244. Id. at 1487. The court defined the statute's purpose as affording "basic due process
safeguards to the careers, livelihoods, and reputations of all Nevadans which include students,
alumni, and employees of UNR and UNLV, and the fans and boosters of Nevada intercollegiate
sports." Id.
245. Id. at 1487.
246. Id. at 1488.
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 169-182 and accompanying text (discussing broad interests affected by
NCAA procedures).
249. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1488.
19931 455
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Congress could enact due process legislation limiting the NCAA."
However, the Nevada law makers had no other choice but to pass the Nevada
Due Process Statute precisely because UNLV alone could not act with the
NCAA to change its procedures. While investigating the shortcomings of the
NCAA enforcement proceedings, Congress discovered the problem.
I do not think one school can take the initiative, or will take the initiative
within the framework of the NCAA to try to get revision of procedures and
fairness in these enforcement procedures. The reason is that simply from
my observation one school is afraid to. When the NCAA is one-on-one
with an institution, it is a bad situation. The only way that effective
external pressure can be brought to bring about needed provisions in the
procedures, I think, is by some outside source or by generating sufficient
concern and interest to stir up enough people within the NCAA to take
action collectively." 1
Furthermore, the NCAA has worked on the 'due process' problem within its
own organization for a long time, with no results." 2 Moreover, the impact
of state due process legislation has caused the NCAA to form a special
committee," 3 but "nothing imminent is expected from the NCAA commit-
tee."" 4 Therefore, because UNLV alone can't work within the framework
of the NCAA to try to get revision of the NCAA's enforcement procedures,
coupled with the fact that neither Congress nor the NCAA has made changes,
the only available alternative to prompt action is state due process statutes.
"It is a shame that we may have to do it this way, but it looks like it will
require 50 different legislatures to pass 50 state laws protecting the people
of their states from the NCAA. I believe many states will do so because to
avoid the issue is to invite trouble.""25
First the Miller court's analysis is dubious at best for several reasons.
The Miller facts probably fulfill the requirements of the test espoused in
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,"4 this test considers whether a
statute is necessary and reasonable to serve an important public purpose.
The Miller court erred by saying "[the Nevada law simply does not possess
the attributes of those state laws that have survived challenge under the
Contract Clause."" In Spannaus, the Court listed three "attributes of
250. Id.
251. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 44 (citing Trial Record 108, Reference 11 at 55 (the
testimony of Irwin Ward)).
252. Beckett, supra note 45, at 16.
253. "Distinguished jurists, including former Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Berger
and former federal District Judge Philip Tone, are joined by other similarly distinguished
individuals. Their announced task is to review NCAA procedures in light of the 'due process'
controversy." Id.
254. Id.
255. YAEGER, supra note 3, at 241.
256. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
257. Miller, 795 F. Supp. at 1488 (citing Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 244).
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these state laws that in the past have survived challenge": 1) the statute
concerned a broad generalized economic or social problem, 2) it operated
in an area already subject to state regulation at the time the contractual
obligations were entered into, and 3) it effected simply a temporary alter-
ation of the contractual relationship." The Nevada statute satisfies the
first two attributes and thus survives challenge.
First, the Nevada Due Process Statute concerned a broad generalized
economic or social problem. 9 On appeal, Tarkanian argues the Nevada
Legislature enacted the statute "to protect the reputations and careers of
Nevada state employees, students and others subject to the NCAA's
enforcement machine."' He maintains the statute guards against unfair
proceedings which may "wrongfully disrupt the participation in and
enjoyment of college sports programs, and unfairly end the careers of
coaches and other university employees as well as rising young student-ath-
letes." ' Furthermore, school alumni, sports fans and Nevada residents
with an interest in the State's reputation are protected by the Nevada Due
Process Statute. 2 Additionally, the statute protects Nevada schools from
sanctions without receiving minimum due process, which guards the schools'
interests in obtaining valuable television contracts. These television contracts
help fund Nevada institutions on the whole. Simply stated, this statute pro-
vides some Nevada citizens in a wide array of categories with procedural due
process, and protects the participation in and enjoyment of college sports
coupled with the protection of the careers and livelihoods of coaches,
university employees and student athletes, thereby dealing with a broad social
problem.'
Second, the Nevada Due Process Statute operated in an area already
subject to state regulation at the time the contractual obligations were entered
into.' The Nevada Administrative Procedure Act and the general rules
of civil procedure governed all Nevada administrative proceedings at the time
the NCAA and UNLV entered into any contract.' Therefore, because the
state regulated the contractual obligations at the time of the contract, and the
statute operated in this area, the Nevada Due Process Statute satisfies the
second prong of the Spannaus test.
However, unlike the third characteristic in Spannaus, the Statute does
not temporarily alter the contractual relationship. It is clear from a reading
of the Nevada Due Process Statute, looking at the language and construction,
258. Id. at 250.
259. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 42.
260. Id. at 44.
261. Id. at 42.
262. Moreover, if Nevada's reputation is tarnished because of unfair NCAA sanctions, this
may impact Nevada's tourism and gambling market.
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that it is not temporary in nature.' The statute carefully outlines mini-
mum procedural due process requirements to protect concerned individuals
in Nevada. Therefore, the Statute permanently affected the contractual
relationship between the NCAA and UNLV. When a statute works "a
severe, permanent, and immediate change in [contractual] relations
irrevocably and retroactively, the statute probably will not withstand Contract
Clause analysis." 7 However, because the Nevada Statute falls within the
first two Spannaus categories, the statute should sufficiently possess the
attributes of those state laws that have survived Contract Clause challenges.
Therefore, the Nevada statute should withstand Contract Clause analysis.
IV. DUE PROCESS STATUTES: THEIR FUTURE?
Congressional subcommittee hearings and investigations have compelled
the NCAA to scrutinize its enforcement program and acknowledge due
process inadequacies.' However, based on the 1988 Tarkanian decision
and Congress' failure to enact due process legislation limiting the NCAA,
"the torch has been passed to the state legislatures to protect the due process
rights of those alleged to have violated the NCAA rules."' In addition
to Nevada, Nebraska, Illinois, and Florida have responded by enacting
legislation requiring national collegiate athletic associations to provide
minimum standards of procedural due process to schools under investigation
for rules violations.2'
A. The Nebraska Collegiate Athletics Association Act
In 1990, the Nebraska Collegiate Athletics Association Procedures Act
266. See id.
267. Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 250 (citing United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 22 (1977)).
268. MeKenna, supra note 45, at 101.
269. Id.
270. Timothy J. Lilley, Lobbying Groups Continue Efforts Against the NCAA, NCAA NEWS,
July 31, 1991, at 10. NCAA Executive Director Richard D. Schultz feels that NCAA member
schools are not 100% behind these unnecessary statutes:
Legislation has been passed that has not been supported by NCAA member
institutions. . . Some bills, in fact, have been approved in spite of testimony in
opposition by representatives of member institutions .... One message I believe this
sends is that the members must be very active in their own states-at the grass-roots
level-in making their elected officials aware of the problems these kinds of bills
create for the NCAA and of the fact that these measures simply are not necessary.
. .the NCAA's investigative process currently is designed to be a joint effort-one
where member institutions cooperate with the Committee on Infractions and the
NCAA enforcement staff. If doe not appear that any of these state bills would do
anything to enhance that spirit of cooperation. . . State laws like these are not
necessary, and the membership has not shown interest in having them.
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was signed into law.271 The Nebraska Act calls the NCAA "a private
monopolist that controls intercollegiate athletics throughout the United
States. " 'n By virtue of the NCAA's monopolistic control and its power
to prevent non-conforming institutions from competing in intercollegiate
athletic events, the NCAA exercises great power over member institu-
tions.' The NCAA, by imposing penalties on colleges or universities for
rules violations, may cause "substantial monetary loss, serious disruption of
athletic programs, and significant damage to reputation."274 Therefore,
"because of such potentially serious and far reaching consequences," the Act
provides that all NCAA penalty proceedings shall comply with due process
of law as guaranteed by the Nebraska Constitution. 5  However, because
the Nebraska Act only generally suggests the NCAA comply with due
process, without a specific description of the requirements for a fair trial, the
Act may fail constitutional analysis for vagueness reasons. 6  Improving
upon the Nebraska bill, Illinois lawmakers built a more extensive and specific
Due Process Statute.2"
271. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 85-1201 to 85-1210. The Nebraska legislators passed the Act
because of recent NCAA sanctions against the University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State
University which could cost the Nebraska Comhuskers as much as $500,000 a year in television
contracts and bowl game appearances. McKenna, supra note 45, at 103 (citing Neb. Bill Would




275. § 85-1203(7). Nebraska Senator Ernest Chambers, the main drafter of the Nebraska
Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures Act, described the statute:
The bill simply requires that, in every single stage or facet of action by the NCAA
that might result in a penalty against a school for violation or alleged violation of
NCAA rules, due process must be applied .... And due process, to make it as
simple as I can, is a procedure which is fair. You have a right to know what you're
charged with, to face your accuser, an opportunity to test the evidence to be used
against you through cross-examination, and the things that most people would think
of in order to have a fair accusation and a fair opportunity to meet those accusations.
YAEGER, supra note 3, at 237-38.
Furthermore, when NCAA legal counsel said the Nebraska statute wouldn't really affect
the NCAA because it already had procedural due process safeguards and believed in fair
enforcement, Senator Chambers laughed. Id. at 238. Chambers replied, "[tihe NCAA is an
arrogant organization, almost uncontrollable and accountable to nobody.... [a]nd since they're
in a position to do so much damage to a university or a coach or even a player, they have to be
accountable." Id.
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B. The Illinois Collegiate Athletic
Association Compliance Procedures Act
On September 12, 1991, Illinois legislators enacted the Athletic
Association Compliance Procedure Act. 8 Similar to its Nebraska counter-
part, the Illinois Act provides due process protection during collegiate
investigations by the NCAA.2 9 Nonetheless, the Illinois Act improved
upon the Nebraska Act by outlining the requirements for a fair trial.
The Illinois Act also begins by noting the monopolistic nature of the
NCAA with paramount importance placed on fair enforcement proce-
dures. ' It claims a deep public interest by "ensuring that the procedures
for determining whether violations of association rules have actually occurred
are fair to its students, university or college employees, institutions of higher
learning, and the communities in which the institutions operate.""1 In sup-
port of its contention that due process safeguards serve a deep public interest,
the Illinois Act points to three separate arguments.' First, the Act claims
that individual student athletes or employees, such as coaches or athletic
directors, risk serious damage to their reputations, "the means to make a
livelihood, and personal and professional aspirations."' Second, the Act
argues that a school may suffer monetary loss and disruption of its athletic
programs, which would directly lessen taxpayer support to that institu-
tion .' Lastly, "the State has a right to feel pride in the accomplishments
and reputations of its institutions of higher learning and seek to protect its
institutions' reputations from harm inflicted by unfair means."' There-
fore, because "the present procedures of collegiate athletic associations do
not reflect the principle that one is innocent until proven guilty," 6 the
Illinois Act outlines specific requirements for NCAA hearings, penalties, and
liability.w
278. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 2901-2903 (Smith-Hurd 1991). Illinois Representative
Tim Johnson, who filed the bill with the Illinois legislature said, "If we pass bills in three or
four states, you could see a stampede. . . . As it is right now the NCAA is a modem-day
counterpart to the Third Reich. We [in Illinois] have a long history of what people would call
arbitrary and capricious treatment by the NCAA. We need to establish a set of rules to prevent
this sort of thing from happening again." YAEGER, supra note 3, at 241.
279. Para. 2902(1).







287. See generally ch. 144, para. 2901-2903.
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1. Hearings
The NCAA may not impose any penalties on any colleges or universi-
ties, unless it first complies with the rules of the Illinois Act. 8 The
Illinois Act requires: findings in writing supported by clear and convincing
evidence, two month notification of charges prior to hearing, the right to
have counsel present, to interrogate and cross-examine witnesses, and to
present a complete defense.' Furthermore, the rules of evidence at
Illinois civil trials shall apply at hearings, charged individuals shall be
entitled to full disclosure of all facts and matters as a defendant in a criminal
proceeding, and any hearing shall be open to the public. Additionally, no
hearing will be allowed more than 6 months from the date on which the
school first receives notice from the NCAA of potential rules violations, the
NCAA must provide the school with a transcript of all hearings at the
NCAA's expense, and findings from the hearing are subject to review by the
circuit court.'
2. Penalties
All penalties imposed by the NCAA on the school, or mandated by the
NCAA to be administered against a student or employee must "bear a
reasonable relationship to the violation committed.""29  In addition,
penalties must be of the same degree and magnitude in similar situations for
similar violations,' and are subject to review by the circuit court.2 3
The goal of the penalty provisions is to ensure the even distribution of pun-
ishment by the NCAA Infractions Committee against guilty member
institutions.
3. Liability
Significantly, "[1liability strikes right at the heart of the Act . . .[w]ith-
out a doubt the chief concern of the drafters of this Act is money."' The
Act notes that "[p]articipation in sports on a national level ... creates a
greater sense of pride and loyalty among students, faculty, alumni, and other
citizens who may contribute more to the school of their choice because of its







294. McKenna, supra note 45, at 107.
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to fund its various programs." 295 Furthermore, as discussed earlier, the
Act adds the school may suffer monetary loss and disruption of its athletic
programs, which would directly lessen taxpayer support to that institu-
tion.' The Act aims to protect the revenue generated by hosting major
sporting events which will directly benefit surrounding college and university
areas.' The NCAA is liable for findings contrary to the Illinois Act
which requires the NCAA to pay damages, costs, litigation expenses,
attorney's fees, and equitable relief."' This, in turn, will motivate a long
overdue restructuring of the NCAA enforcement procedures. 2 9
C. The Florida Collegiate Athletic Association
Compliance Enforcement Procedures Act
The Florida Collegiate Athletic Association Compliance Enforcement
Procedures Act went into effect on June 1, 1992.1 For all practical pur-
poses, the Florida and Illinois Acts are the same. Both statutes call for due
process in the NCAA's enforcement process. In fact, the Florida act is
mainly comprised of parts taken from the Illinois Act.
However, there are two distinct differences between the Florida and
Illinois Acts. First, the Florida Act does not address the economic signifi-
cance of collegiate athletics, nor does it discuss Florida's deep public interest
in fairness to students, school employees, universities and their communities.
Second, in Florida, once the NCAA notifies the school of investigations, the
NCAA must hold a hearing within 12 months?0 1 In contrast, the NCAA
only has 6 months to hold a hearing in Illinois after the NCAA notifies the
school of investigations.' - Also, if a Florida school identifies its own
violation, the NCAA has 18 months from the time of notification to hold a





299. McKenna, supra note 45, at 121.
300. FLA. ANN. STAT. §§ 240.5339-.5349 (West 1992).
NCAA enforcement staff member David Berst, in an attempt to scare Florida lawmakers,
described the Florida Act "as an inappropriate intrusion into our operation. I don't know how
I can say it any more clearly. The few politicians that are seizing the opportunity to obtain a
little bit of local support because of the use of the term 'due process' are really doing a
disservice to the NCAA and, I think, to the people of the state involved." YAEGER, supra note
3, at 240. Furthermore, NCAA's John Kitchin implied that if Illinois passed the due processbill they may "jeopardize the NCAA membership of schools in Illinois." Id. at 239. Kitchin
padded his statement insisting, "This isn't a threat. We're not saying anybody's going to get
kicked out. But as a voluntary member, you have to comply with the same rules that bind the
other members." Id. at 240.
301. § 240.531(9).
302. See generally ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 2904(i) (Smith-Hurd 1991).
303. FLA. ANN. STAT. § 240.531(9).
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Florida lawmakers give the NCAA more time to act than their Illinois
counterparts.
D. The Nevada Due Process Statute
The Nevada governor signed the Nevada Due Process Statute 5 into
law on April 8, 1991.1 As noted above, the Nevada Due Process Statute
was passed primarily because of the long-running battle between the NCAA
and coach Jerry Tarkanian. 7 The Nevada Statute, like its predecessors
in Illinois and Florida, aimed to force the NCAA to comport with minimum
standards of procedural due process."°8 However, while the Nevada statute
is substantially similar to both the Illinois and Florida Acts, it is also
noticeably different. Before examination of the differences between the due
process statutes, a brief look at the Nevada Statute's proceedings, procedural
rules, and relief provisions will lay a foundation to understand the Nevada
law.
1. Proceedings
The proceedings requirements of the Nevada Due Process Statute consist
of several categories.' The general requirements guarantee the accused
the right to a hearing, after reasonable notice of the time, place, and nature
of the proceeding, the rules governing the proceeding, and the factual basis
for each violation.310  Furthermore, the Statute provides the accused the
right to be represented by counsel, the right to confront and respond to all
witnesses and evidence and the right to call his own witnesses .31 Also, the
accused has the right to the exchange of all evidence 30 days before any
proceeding and the right to have all statements signed under oath and nota-
rized.31 ' Finally, the parties may informally dispose of the proceeding by
stipulation, settlement or default and may waive the requirements of findings
of fact and decision.1 3
Additionally, the accused has the right to an official record of all the
proceedings314 and, upon request, the transcriptions of all oral statements
304. See generally ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 2904(i).
305. NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 398.155-.255 (1991).
306. J. Lilley, Lobbying Groups Continue Efforts Against the NCAA, NCAA NEWS, July
31, 1991 at 10.
307. Lederman, supra note 1, at A35.
308. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 9-10.
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made at the proceedings." 5 Only evidence relied upon by reasonable and
prudent men may be admitted, while irrelevant, unduly repetitious, or
immaterial evidence must be excluded from a proceeding. 6 Furthermore,
the accused has the right to have an impartial person presiding over the
proceeding.317 The decision must be rendered within a reasonable time,
with findings of fact based upon substantial evidence in the record and
supported by a preponderance of such evidence." Finally, any accused
falling under the Nevada Due Process Statute has the right to judicial review
under Nevada law.3 19
2. Procedural Rules, Standard for Findings, and Nature of Penalties
The Nevada Due Process Statute requires the NCAA to comply with the
procedural standards, set out above, before the association may "impose a
sanction on any institution located in this state, its employees, student
athletes, students or boosters, for a violation of the rules of the associa-
tion."3"' Furthermore, after a hearing in conformance with the Statute, the
NCAA must base its finding a violation upon a preponderance of the
evidence "commonly relied upon by reasonable and prudent men in the
conduct of their affairs." 32' Any penalties the NCAA imposes must be
reasonable in light of both the nature and gravity of the violation and com-
mensurate with violations imposed on other schools for violations of similar
nature and gravity.3'
3. The Big Stick: Injunctions and Other Relief
The Nevada Due Process Statute enables a district court to enjoin any
NCAA proceeding in violation of the Statute's guidelines. 313 Moreover,
in combination with any injunctive relief, the court must award a successful
claimant costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and 100 percent of the monetary
loss the school suffered as a result of the penalty imposed in violation of the
315. § 398.175.
316. § 398.185. Additionally, § 398.185 provides that in a proceeding Nevada privilege
laws must be observed, objections to evidentiary matters may be made and noted in the record,
and "[e]vidence may be received in written form if it will result in an expedited proceeding and
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Nevada Due Process Statute.' These remedies are cumulative and added
to other remedies provided by Nevada law."z
4. How the Nevada, Florida, and Illinois Statutes Differ
The most obvious difference between the Nevada Statute and its Illinois
and Florida counterparts is in the basis of the findings. In Florida and Illi-
nois, any finding of a violation must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence.3" In Nevada, the decision and the findings must be supported
by a preponderance of the evidence. 27 Therefore, the Nevada Statute
requires the NCAA to adhere to a lesser standard of proof than the Statutes
in Illinois and Florida.
Additionally, the Nevada Due Process Statute differs from the Florida
and Illinois Acts in the pre-hearing discovery procedures and who presides
over the hearings. First, the Florida and Illinois statutes provide that all
individuals and institutions charged with misconduct by the NCAA "shall be
entitled to full disclosure of all relevant facts and matters to the same degree
as a defendant in a criminal case and shall have the same right to discovery
as applies in criminal and civil cases."'3  However, in contrast, the
Nevada Due Process Statute merely says that "[a]t least 30 days before any
proceeding, all parties to a proceeding shall provide to all other parties all
affidavits or other evidence to be introduced at the proceeding."329
Second, the Nevada Due Process Statute specifically states that a "person
presiding over a proceeding must be impartial and shall not communicate
with a party to the proceeding concerning any issue of fact or law except
upon notice and opportunity to participate by all parties."3' In sharp
contrast, neither the Illinois nor the Florida Acts provide for an "impartial"
presiding officer. Thus, the NCAA will get to choose its own presiding
officer in Illinois and Florida.
Lastly, the Nevada Statute goes further than the Illinois or Florida Acts
in prohibiting the NCAA from activities in contravention of the due process
324. § 398.245(2). "To calculate monetary loss for the purposes of this subsection, '100
percent of the monetary loss per year' shall be deemed to be equal to the gross amount realized
by the affected athletic program during the immediately preceding calendar year." Id.
325. § 398.255.
326. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 2904(b) (Smith-Hurd 1991) and FLA. ANN. STAT.
§ 240.531(2) (West 1992).
327. NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 398.205, 398.225(2). "Any finding of a violation by a national
collegiate athletic association must be based upon and supported by a preponderance of evidence
which is of the type commonly relied upon by reasonable and prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs and which has been submitted and received in a hearing held and conducted in
conformance with the provisions of NRS 398.155 to 398.255, inclusive." Id. § 398.225(2)
(1991).
328. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 2904(f) (Smith-Hurd 1991) and FLA. ANN. STAT.
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statute and liability. First, the Nevada Statute, like its Florida and Illinois
predecessors, prohibits the NCAA from imposing penalties on institutions in
violation of the NCAA's rules unless in accordance with the due process
statute.3 31 However, the Nevada Statute goes further than its counterparts
by prohibiting the NCAA from even "threatening" an institution with
sanctions if it seeks redress under the Due Process Statute. 32 Second, the
Nevada Statute offers an institution more relief than the statutes in Illinois or
Florida. In Florida and Illinois, if the NCAA violates the due process stat-
utes it is liable to the institution or individual for damages, costs, litigation
expenses, attorney's fees and appropriate equitable relief.33 While the Ne-
vada Statute includes the same liability provisions,' it goes further by
providing that a "district court may enjoin a national collegiate athletic asso-
ciation or institution from violating the provisions [of the statute]. "3
CONCLUSION
Tarkanian has appealed the Miller decision. 36  Because the Due
Process Statutes in Nebraska, Illinois, Florida and Nevada are similar, the
ultimate decision of the Miller case will be persuasive material with which
either states and schools or the NCAA will use in future courtroom
confrontations. If Miller is upheld on appeal, other states will have difficulty
enforcing their own statutes, 37 and any hope of due process in NCAA
enforcement procedures will be all but lost. The surest remaining alternative
to require the NCAA to provide member schools with due process is to
reverse Miller and allow the Nevada Due Process Statute's proper and much
needed existence. The United States Supreme Court's decision holding that
the NCAA is not a state actor and Congress' reluctance to require the NCAA
to abide by due process standards bears this out. A reversal of Miller would
not only protect Nevada schools and schools in other states, but would also
make clear the message that universities, coaches and athletes must be treated
with fairness at NCAA enforcement sessions.
Moreover, if Miller stands on appeal, the only remaining alternative to
spur NCAA change would be a Congressional mandate ordering the NCAA
to comport with minimum standards of due process. Although Congress has
331. NEV. REV. STAT. § 398.235, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, par. 2908 (Smith-Hurd 1991),
and FLA. ANN. STAT. § 240.5345.
332. NEV. REV. STAT. § 398.235(2) (1991).
333. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 2909 and FLA. ANN. STAT. § 240.5346.
334. NEV. REV. STAT. § 398.245.
335. § 398.245(1).
336. The Appellant's Opening Brief was filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit on November 9, 1992. A.O.B., supra note 5.
337. NCAA officials said they were pleased with the Miller trial court's decision and hoped
it would weaken the basis for the due process statutes in Nebraska, Florida, and Illinois. The
NCAA felt the decision would discourage other states from instituting such laws. Lederman,
supra note 1, at A35.
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historically been reluctant to pass NCAA limiting legislation in this area,33
the ushering-in of the Clinton administration may lend hope. The new
president may have a greater inclination to bring government action in areas
where Reagan and Bush wanted to deregulate. Nonetheless, regardless of the
Miller appeal's result, both avenues must be pursued vigorously to bring
about a much needed change. The time has come for the NCAA to swallow
some of its own medicine... and learn to play fairly.
PoSTScRiPT: THE END OF A
CAREER AND UNLV's FUTURE
In June of 1991, Jerry Tarkanian announced that the 1991-92 season
would be his last as head basketball coach for the Runnin' Rebels.339
Tarkanian finished his UNLV career with a flurry of wins, steam rolling to
a 95-8 record his last three seasons and winning the NCAA national
championship in 1990.Y After continual flack from the NCAA and
UNLV's President, Robert Maxson, Tarkanian threw in the proverbial
college basketball sucking towel and joined ranks with the National
Basketball Association's San Antonio Spurs in 1992." However, Tarkan-
ian's pro career was short lived. Only 20 games into the season, because of
disagreements with management and a difficult transition period, Tarkanian
was replaced by John Lucas." 2  Ironically, "[t]he one consolation for
Tarkanian was probably the promise shown by Daniels, his one-time UNLV
proteg6 whose college recruitment had added to Tarkanian's troubles with the
National Collegiate Athletic Association."' Tarkanian, convinced Lloyd
Daniels had a promising future in the National Basketball Association, had
recruited him for the Spurs.' "Lloyd," Tarkanian predicted, "will be at
338. A.O.B., supra note 5, at 13.
339. Danny Robbins, Tarkanian and the Spurs Reach Point of No Return; Pro Basketball:
Forner UNLV Coach is Replaced by Lucas Less than Two Months into the Season, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 1992, at Cl. "That announcement was made shortly after the publication of
photographs showing three of Tarkanian's former players socializing with convicted sport fixer
Richard Perry. At the same time, UNLV was responding to an NCAA letter of official inquiry
outlining charges of rles violations by UNLV coaches and representatives. Id.
340. Thomas Bonk, The Shark Isn't Hooked; First-Year NBA Coach Jerry Tarkanian is Frus-
trated Enough by Spurs that He Might Consider Quitting at the End of the Season, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1992, at C3.
341. Id. Jerry Tarkanian succinctly described his reasons for coaching in the NBA by
saying, "Why did I take this job? I wasn't ready to retire.... If I had a hobby, I wouldn't be
here today .... Fishing, tennis, golf ... God, I hate golf." Id.
342. Robert MeG. Thomas Jr., Pro Basketball; 20 and Out: Tarkanian is Fired by Spurs,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1992, at 31. Coach Tarkanian was formally "dismissed on December
18, 1992, as head coach of the San Antonio Spurs hours before the team's 21st game of the
season, against Dallas at home." Id. "I'll never coach again," Tarkanian said. "I'm all done.
I probably shouldn't have gotten into it this time. I'm 62 years old. I probably ought to be out
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this a lot longer than me. "3 5
Into the vacuum created by Tarkanian's absence stepped one-time
Villanova great Rollie Massimino as the new head coach for the UNLV
Runnin' Rebels.' However, because Tarkanian is still popular and now
back in town, "no headliner on the Strip has ever had a tougher act to follow
than the 58-year-old Massimino."I 7 Adding fuel to the fire, "Tarkanian
loyalists have accused Massimino and the UNLV administration of fudging
basketball attendance records, padding the schedule with weak opponents and
345. Id. Coach Jerry Tarkanian's Career Record was impressive.
COLLEGE
Year School W L Pct.
1969 CS Long Beach 23 3 .885
1970 CS Long Beach 24 5 .828
1971 CS Long Beach* 22 4 .846
1972 CS Long Beach* 23 3 .885
1973 CS Long Beach* 24 2 .923
1974 UNLV 20 6 .769
1975 UNLV 24 5 .828
1976 UNLV 29 2 .935
1977 UNLV 29 3 .906
1978 UNLV 20 8 .714
1979 UNLV 21 8 .724
1980 UNLV 23 9 .719
1981 UNLV 16 12 .571
1982 UNLV 20 10 .667
1983 UNLV 28 3 .903
1984 UNLV 29 6 .829
1985 UNLV 28 4 .875
1986 UNLV 33 5 .868
1987 UNLV 37 2 .949
1988 UNLV 28 6 .824
1989 UNLV 29 8 .784
1990 UNLV 35 5 .875
1991 UNLV 34 1 .971
1992 UNLV 26 2 .929
Totals 625 122 .837
*NCAA Tournament record of 6-3 voided for recruiting violations. NCAA
Tournament Record: 34-16.
NBA
Year Team W L Pet.
1992 San Antonio 9 11 .450
Robbins, supra note 339, at Cl.
346. David Leon Moore, Rebel with a New Cause: Massimino Brings Own Style to UNLV,
USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1993, at IC. "Short squat Rollie Massimino has always resembled a
pinball, especially as he careens from one end of the bench to the other, exhorting players,
excoriating refs." Id. UNLV, which used to play the Jaws theme in "Tark the Sharks" honor,
now greets Massimino with the theme from The Godfather before home games. William F.
Reed, Inside College Basketball: Desert Storm, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 11, 1993, at 54.
347. William F. Reed, Inside College Basketball: Desert Storm, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan.
11, 1993, at 54. Tarkanian has shown support of Massimino but still blasts UNLV's President,
Maxson, every chance he gets. "'I'd like to be able to go to practice and then go and have a
beer with Rollie,' said Tarkanian soon after returning to Vegas. 'But we can't, because if he
said anything in support of Maxson, I'd vomit."' Id.
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pulling strings so that star player J.R. Rider' could remain academically
eligible this season after failing to complete more than a dozen credits last
spring-just so Massimino would look good in his first year [at
UNLV]."1 9 Ironically, it seems that the NCAA and UNLV are letting
Massimino get away with the same fudging of the NCAA rules for which
they crucified Tarkanian. However, as Massimino becomes more accepted
by the fans at the Thomas & Mack Center,3" the bitter memories of
NCAA sanctions will fade. And UNLV will begin a new era of basketball
Rollie style.
Kenneth E. James*
348. J.R. Rider was suspended from UNLV's basketball team on March 16, 1993, because
he turned in an English paper written by a school tutor. Danny Robbins, Rider Suspended in
Paper Chase; College Basketball: UNLV Punished No. 2 Scorer After Tutor Acknowledges
Writing Part of his English Paper, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at Cl. The teacher said she
was pressed by two UNLV officials to pass Rider. Id. Some of Rider's papers contained hand-
writing not his own and "Rider's first name, Isaiah, was incorrectly spelled on at least three
papers he turned in." Id. Rider said on his behalf, "I feel that I've been made a public
scapegoat by the university . .. there has been nothing but lies, fraud and deceit by school
officials, while my family, teammates, and myself have been embarrassed in public." Lonnie
White, Rider Says He is a Scapegoat, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at C7.
349. Moore, supra note 332, at IC.
350. In late January 1993, the Georgetown Hoyas came to Las Vegas where "the No. 15
Runnin' Rebels administered Georgetown's worst defeat of the season, 96-80, and also extended
the nation's longest home winning streak to 57." Alison Muscatine, Rider, Rebels Run
Georgetown Ragged, The WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1993, at D1.
* B.A., 1990, Stanford University; Expected J.D., 1994, California Western School of Law.
Thanks to Professor Glenn Smith, Sue Holloway, Gary Van Luchene, Kathy Freeburg and Frank
Daniels for their valuable assistance. Also, a very special thanks to Jennie Hostettler for her
unfailing love and support.
41
James: College Sports and NCAA Enforcement Procedures: Does the NCAA Pla
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
42
California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss2/5
